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I.

INTRODUCTION

During the past several decades the dynamics of law and policy
reform in Aotearoa/New Zealand have prefigured and encapsulated
contemporary trends in economic state restructuring, indigenous
claims to refigure the nation, and gender struggles for political
representation.
Successive governments have restructured the
economy and the state using radical forms of neo-liberal economic
policy with the stated aim of globalizing the economy, making
1
Aotearoa/New Zealand a  world model for structural adjustment.
Political action on the part of the indigenous Maori people, often led
by Maori women, increased and diversified, and included demands
for self-determination and redress of historical colonial injustices. In
1997, the conservative National Partys Jenny Shipley became the
*

Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Waikato, LLM (Hons) Victoria, JD (Hons)
Boston University, BA University of Virginia. I would like to thank Penny Pether for
organizing this symposium in response to my query about conferences on
postcolonial theory and the law, and for her ongoing support and helpful
suggestions on articles over the years. The few occasions when we have been in the
same hemisphere have been both intellectually stimulating and fun.
1. JANE KELSEY, T HE NEW ZEALAND E XPERIMENT: A W ORLD MODEL FOR
STRUCTURAL A DJUSTMENT? 1-9 (2d ed. 1997).
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countrys first white female Prime Minister, followed in 1999 by the
election of a center-left coalition headed by Labour Party leader
Helen Clarke. This article analyzes the race and gender dynamics of
these contemporary trends. First, it argues that policies of state
structural adjustment and Maori political claims have converged in
commodified settlements of past colonial injustices as corporate
2
deals. These deals are temporary alliances of men across race to
silence and erase the demands for self-determination or political
power sharing of Maori activists, who are usually Maori women.
Second, this article contends that the political instability created by
rapid structural adjustment and the change to a Mixed Member
Proportional ( MMP ) electoral system converges with white
backlash against these settlements to open space for New Zealands
first two female Prime Ministers. This article also suggests that the
election of a second white female Prime Minister in New Zealand may
reflect the (temporary) regendering of the role of Prime Minister to
the feminine.
II. SILENCING MAORI W OMEN: A LLIANCES OF MEN A CROSS R ACE
Centering Maori women activists in an analysis of the convergence
of policies of structural adjustment and political claims for selfdetermination and redress of colonial injustices suggests that the
settlements were an alliance of men across race to silence these
women. The political activism of some Maori women, gaining
momentum from the 1970s, operated to disrupt the illusion of unity
of the nation. Regaining the illusion of unity, and in particular
reaffirmation of the dominance of the minority of privileged white
men, required erasing these Maori women activists as serious political
subjects. This move required the cooperation of at least some Maori
men in a temporary alliance among men across race in a process of
 settlement of historical colonial injustices. This part examines
Maori activisms disruption of New Zealands illusion of national
unity, and the resultant configuring of a national identity as
bicultural. It then briefly discusses policies of structural adjustment
and the corresponding emergence of a national identity of global
entrepreneurs. The production of these two national identities
resulted in tensions that were resolved through the settlements
process, with the assimilation of some Maori men to the new national
identity of global entrepreneurs. This resolution restored the illusion
of national unity, silencing and erasing the activism of Maori women.
2. See JANE F LAX, T HE A MERICAN D REAM
T HOMAS H EARINGS 94-113 (1998).
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A. Disrupting New Zealands Illusion of National Unity: The Nation as
Bicultural
The dominant story of the founding of Aotearoa/New Zealand is a
simple one of cession of sovereignty by the indigenous Maori people
to the British in the English version of the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840
3
( Treaty ), resulting in one unified British New Zealand. Contrary
to the dominant story, it has been argued persuasively that the Maori
version of the Treaty, signed by most Maori leaders, did not cede
4
sovereignty to the British. Historical data suggests that, in the Maori
version of the Treaty, Maori people agreed to the British coming into
the country to govern the British while Maori retained their
5
traditional control over their land and people. The  appropriative
6
mistranslation of the English version of the Treaty, which clearly
ceded sovereignty, into a Maori version that envisioned power
sharing, was followed by the repression of the Maori version in the
dominant foundation story. The textual and material violence
necessary to this repression produced an illusion of national unity.
7
Simultaneously, however, repression results in return. There have
been repeated disruptions to the myth of national unity throughout
8
New Zealands history.
Discourses of biculturalism, which gained momentum in the 1970s,
developed out of the most recent disruption to the illusion of
national unity in New Zealand. Political activism on the part of
Maori, often initiated and led by Maori women, increased and
9
diversified. The local context of Treaty protests was framed by the
global development of discourses of multiculturalism and
indigenous, self-determination claims.
The 1984 Labour
Government promised prior to the election to honour the Treaty and
3. Treaty of Waitangi, Feb. 6, 1840, Gr. Brit.-N.Z., available at
http://www.govt.nz/aboutnz/treat.php3.
4. See R.J. Walker, The Treaty of Waitangi As the Focus of Maori Protest, in W AITANGI:
MAORI AND PAKEHA PERSPECTIVES OF THE T REATY OF W AITANGI 263, 263-79 (I.H.
Kawharu ed., 1989).
5. See id. at 278; see also D AVID W ILLIAMS, Te Tiriti o Waitangi Unique Relationship
Between Crown and Tangata Whenua?, in W AITANGI: MAORI AND PAKEHA PERSPECTIVES OF
THE T REATY OF W AITANGI 64, 79 (I.H. Kawharu ed., 1989).
6. Elizabeth Constable, Critical Departures: Salammbos Orientalism, 111 MOD .
LANGUAGE NOTES 625, 634-35 (1996).
7. See Nan Seuffert, Colonising Concepts of the Good Citizen, Laws Deceptions and the
Treaty of Waitangi, 4 LAW T EXT C ULTURE 69, 78-79, 94-95 (1998).
8. See id.
9. See generally Denese Henare, Carrying the Burden of Arguing the Treaty, in VISION
A OTEAROA: KAUPAPA NEW ZEALAND , 126-36 (Witi Ihimaera ed., 1994); JANE KELSEY, A
QUESTION OF H ONOUR?: LABOUR AND THE T REATY 1984-1989 20-22 (1990) [hereinafter
KELSEY, QUESTION OF H ONOUR].
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10

to settle Treaty grievances. Initially the Governments discussions of
these issues occurred in terms of multiculturalism and even broader
11
equity considerations.
The broad discussion of equity and multiculturalism was not
satisfactory to many Maori people, who responded with claims that
biculturalism was the appropriate relationship for Maori and non12
Maori under the Treaty of Waitangi. Some argued that a focus on
multiculturalism was an excuse for  doing nothing and a means by
which the state could silence Maori demands and placate mainstream
13
New Zealand.
Perhaps the most powerful explication of
biculturalism appeared in Moana Jacksons 1988 report on Maori and
the criminal justice system, which critiqued both the systems basis in
a monocultural philosophy and the substantive outcome of criminal
14
convictions. Jackson concluded that parallel legal systems for Maori
15
and non-Maori in Aotearoa were mandated by the Treaty. While
Jacksons report was quickly sidelined and repressed by the
government, his analysis resonated powerfully with many Maori and
16
some Pakeha.
In contrast to Jacksons proposal for parallel legal systems, statesponsored attempts to implement biculturalism included the
establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal, which was eventually given
jurisdiction to hear the claims of Maori for Treaty grievances dating
17
back to 1840. The Tribunal was initially empowered only to make
recommendations to the government with respect to those claims,
not to order redress binding on the government. Jane Kelsey has
cogently argued that the Tribunal process channeled the energy of
claims for full political self-determination into a cumbersome,
expensive, and largely ineffectual apparatus that operated to
legitimate the governments supreme authority, without placing any
10. KELSEY, supra note 1, at 23.
11. See A NDREW SHARP. JUSTICE AND THE MAORI: MAORI C LAIMS IN NEW ZEALAND

POLITICAL A RGUMENT IN THE 1980S 205-26 (1991).
12. See id. at 227.
13. See KUNI JENKINS, Maori Education: A Cultural Experience and Dilemma for the State
 A New Direction for Maori Society, in T HE POLITICS OF LEARNING AND T EACHING IN
A OTEAROA-NEW ZEALAND 153 (Coxon et al. eds., 1994).
14. MOANA JACKSON, T HE MAORI AND THE C RIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: H E
W HAIPAANGA H OU  A NEW PRESPECTIVE (1988) (articulating the stated objectives of
developing research tools that look at crime from different perspectives).
15. Id. at 265.
16. See Sharp, supra note 11, at 235-45  Pakeha is a contested Maori term,
sometimes defined as  a person of predominately European descent. H.W.
W ILLIAMS, A D ICTIONARY OF MAORI LANGUAGE 252 (1997).
17. KELSEY, QUESTION OF H ONOUR , supra note 9, at 227-32.
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18

obligation on it to act.

B. State Structural Adjustment: The Nation as Global Entrepreneurs
Prior to 1984, the New Zealand state might have been described as
socialist, providing free education through the tertiary level, student
living allowances, a comprehensive national health system, an
extensive state housing system primarily in single family dwellings, a
state pension plan, and welfare services and income assistance,
including a domestic purposes benefit for single mothers.19 The State
also owned railways, power generators, television and radio stations,
universities, airlines, many coalmines, most forestry, some hotels, a
20
shipping line, a ferry service, and a number of farms. It wrote wills,
administered deceased estates, and ran banks and the largest
21
contracting business in the country. All of this changed with the
1984 Labour Government, which commenced and accelerated the
project of state structural adjustment. While neo-liberal economic
policies were contradictory to Labours traditional policy stances,
economic and political instability in the early 1980s provided an
opening for a push for law and policy reform by advocates of
structural adjustment within the New Zealand Department of
Treasury ( Treasury ).
These advocates were influenced by
economic theory produced in the United States.22 Treasurys advice
was based on faith in market efficiencies:  [e]ssentially, Treasurys
advice was founded upon the assumption that the economy is self23
righting.
Faith in markets was combined with anxiety about
regulation and the assumption that the economy prior to 1984 had
been constrained from reaching its full potential by government
interventions. The overall prescription for stimulating the economy
involved downsizing the government in favour of more and bigger
markets.
The New Zealand structural adjustment reforms have been divided
24
into three stages. The first stage, commenced by the 1984 Labour
18. Id. at 234-35.
19. See GEOFFREY PALMER , U NBRIDLED POWER ?: A N INTERPRETATION OF THE NEW

ZEALAND S C ONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT 5-6 (1979).
20. See generally id.
21. See generally id.
22. See Andrew F. Simpson, Public Choice Theory and Securities Regulation in New
Zealand, in SECURITIES R EGULATION IN A USTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 217, 236 (Gordon
Walker & Brent Fisse eds., 1994).
23. Id. at 228.
24. See A LLEN SCHICK, T HE SPIRIT OF R EFORM: MANAGING THE NEW ZEALAND STATE
SECTOR IN A T IME OF C HANGE 14-15 (1996). In this report, prepared for the State
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Government, involved deregulating the commercial and financial
markets. The idea was that deregulation freed the market to allow it
to work its miracles. Deregulation included ending wage and price
controls, and deregulating interest rates, controls on external
investment and borrowing, and foreign exchange trading. The New
Zealand dollar was floated on the foreign exchange market, the stock
market and regulation concerning mergers and trade practices were
liberalized, and the country was opened further to foreign investment
and ownership.
The second stage of structural adjustment, beginning in 1986,
provided for the privatization and quasi-privatization of state-owned
assets and utilities. It was assumed that organizing these enterprises
along commercial lines would result in market-driven efficiency
gains. The New Zealand State-Owned Enterprises Act of 1986 ( SOE
Act ) restructured government-owned assets and utilities into
25
Any state-owned
businesses, with a view to their eventual sale.
enterprise ( SOE ) was to be run on a commercial basis and have, as
its primary goal, the production of profits for the government
26
owner. Corporatization and privatization of SOEs led to massive
redundancies of employees and a much  smaller state. For
example, the Ministry of Transport went from employing 4,500
people to a few hundred, contracting out almost all of its activities in
an attempt to stimulate efficiencies through competition for the
contracts.27 Also in the time period of the second stage, what was
essentially another first stage deregulation project was carried out.
The New Zealand Reserve Bank Act of 1989 ( RBA ) was passed,
repealing the New Zealand Reserve Bank Act of 1964 ( 1964 Act ),
28
with price stability through inflation control as its primary objective.
The primary objective of the 1964 Act was to achieve full
29
employment.
In contrast, consistent with  orthodox
macroeconomics, the RBA reflected faith in the marketplace to
Service Commission and the Treasury, Schick discusses New Zealands restructuring
reforms. See generally id.
25. See NEW ZEALAND T REASURY D EPT , E CONOMIC MANAGEMENT : LAND U SE ISSUES
293-94 (1984) [hereinafter E CONOMIC MANAGEMENT].
26. State-Owned Enterprises Act, 1986 § 4(1)(a) (N.Z.).
27. See William D. Eggers, The Wonder Down Under, GOVT E XECUTIVE , May 15,
1999, at 2, available at http://www.govexec.com/news/index.cfm?mode=report&
articleid=9714.
28. Reserve Bank Act, 1964 § 8 (N.Z.); Roger Kerr, Symposium, The New Zealand
Employment Contracts Act: Its Enactment, Performance, and Implications, 28 C AL. W. INTL
L.J. 89, 89 (1997) ( The Reserve Bank Act of 1989 made the central bank
independent of government, with the primary aim of monetary policy being price
stability. ).
29. See KELSEY, supra note 1, at 160-61.
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30

The RBA,
achieve the most efficient level of employment.
therefore, represents a further step in deregulating the economy by a
 hands off stance in monetary policy in relation to employment.
In the third stage of structural adjustment the success of the
application of market principles to the new SOEs was applied to the
31
remaining core state sector. Generally commenced after Labour
was re-elected in 1987, it comprised the reorganization of the
remaining state sector through downsizing, contracting out, and the
imposition of rigid accountability requirements, in attempts to
facilitate efficiencies assumed to be achievable through competitive
32
markets.
A fourth stage, deregulating the labour market and
dismantling the welfare state, gained momentum with the election of
a conservative National Government in 1990. The new Government
immediately repealed the New Zealand Pay Equity Act of 1990 and
the New Zealand National Labour Relations Act of 1987, and
substituted the latter with the radical free market New Zealand
33
Employment Contracts Act 1990 ( ECA ). Weeks after its election
34
it started cuts to the unemployment and domestic purposes benefits.
In the  Mother of all budgets in June of 1991, it introduced further
cuts to benefits and cut community grants, training programs, Maori
35
development and legal aid.
Disposable incomes of beneficiaries
36
were cut by up to thirty percent. Following Treasurys lead, the
National Government argued that cuts were necessary to restore
integrity to the system and to provide incentives for beneficiaries to
37
find work.
Taken together, these four stages represent a radical neo-liberal
economic  experiment voluntarily implemented in New Zealand to
an extent usually only seen in third world countries in response to

30. See id.
31. 1 NEW ZEALAND T REASURY D EPT , GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT : BRIEF TO THE
INCOMING GOVERNMENT 46-95 (1987) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT]; see
also, E CONOMIC MANAGEMENT, supra note 25, at 19.
32. See E CONOMIC MANAGEMENT , supra note 25, at 20-22.
33. Employment Contracts Act, 1991 (N.Z.).
34. See Jonathan Boston, New Zealands Welfare State in Transition, in R EDESIGNING
THE W ELFARE STATE IN NEW ZEALAND : PROBLEMS, POLICIES, PROSPECTS 3, 10 (Jonathan
Boston et al. eds.,1999).
35. JANE KELSEY, R OLLING BACK THE STATE : PRIVATISATION OF POWER IN
A OTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND 84 (1993) [hereinafter KELSEY, R OLLING BACK].
36. See GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT , supra note 31, at 14.
37. See Robert Stephens, Poverty, Family Finances and Social Security, in R EDESIGNING
THE W ELFARE STATE IN NEW ZEALAND : PROBLEMS, POLICIES, PROSPECTS 238 (Jonathan
Boston et al. eds., 1999).
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38

pressure from international monetary organizations. These reforms
have taken Aotearoa/New Zealand from one of the most highly
regulated to one of the least regulated countries in the Organisation
39
for Economic Co-operation and Development ( OECD ), making it
a model for neo-liberal economic policies.  Anyone who looks at
privatization and government reform trends around the world tends
to look first at New Zealand . . . no one has done a better job than
40
New Zealand capitalizes on this reputation by  actively
them.
41
export[ing] advice on deregulation and privatisation.
The National Partys dramatic decline in support at the 1993
election and the success of a referendum to change the electoral
system from first-past-the-post ( FPP ) to MMP representation are
both often attributed to the lack of popularity of, at least, the fourth
42
stage reforms of the welfare state. The National Party was re-elected
in 1993 by a slim majority in a context where the only other choice
was the party that had initiated the radical reforms. Perhaps alerted
to the possibility of overturns to its policy initiatives by its close win,
and disturbed by predictions that MMP would result in more
representative governments, the 1993 National Government quickly
moved to attempt to entrench their fiscal policy through the New
Zealand Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1994 ( FRA ).43 The fiscal
strategies embedded in the FRA include stating principles of
responsible fiscal management, which were seen as necessary to the
44
maintenance of the confidence of the markets. These principles
include reducing Crown debt by running budget surpluses,
maintaining stable tax rates, and prudently managing the Crowns
financial risks (usually by privatising Crown assets to avoid risks of
45
loss). The requirement of extensive reports by the Government to
the House of Representatives provides for monitoring of compliance
38. See Noam Chomsky, Old Wine in New Bottles: A Bitter Taste, 2 E LECTRONIC J.
R ADICAL O RG. T HEORY 1, 4 (1996) (comparing free market theory in todays First and
Third World within the context of a symposium on JANE KELSEY, T HE NEW ZEALAND
E XPERIMENT: A W ORLD MODEL FOR STRUCTURAL A DJUSTMENT? (1997)), available at
http://www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/depts/sml/journal/indexv11/chomsky.htm.
39. See KELSEY, supra note 1, at 85-90.
40. Eggers, supra note 27, at 2 (quoting U.S. Representative Scott Klug on federal
privitisation).
41. Wendy Larner, The New Boys: Restructuring in New Zealand, 1984-1994, 3 SOC.
POL. 32, 32 (1996).
42. See Boston, supra note 34, at 15-16.
43. Fiscal Responsibility Act, 1994 (N.Z.) [hereinafter  FRA ].
44. See JANE KELSEY, R ECLAIMING THE F UTURE : NEW ZEALAND AND THE GLOBAL
E CONOMY 376 (1999) [hereinafter KELSEY, R ECLAIMING THE F UTURE].
45. FRA § 4(2).
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46

with these principles. The FRA allows for only temporary departure
47
Further,
from the principles of responsible fiscal management.
while the FRA is not formally entrenched in New Zealand law, noncompliance with its reporting requirements, or repeal, opens any
government to attack on the basis that it is irresponsible with the
countrys money.
The stated aim of structural adjustment was making New Zealand
markets (including its labour market) and products globally
48
competitive. Competition became the buzzword and the benefits of
49
The centrality of
competition were continually espoused.
competition to the economic policies restructuring the state required
a corresponding rewriting of New Zealands national identity. The
national identity had to be shifted from one in which the motto  we
50
take care of each other was prominent, to one that emphasized
self-sufficiency, individual responsibility and individual competition
in domestic and global marketplaces:  For 40 years, New Zealand
tried to build a civil society in which all its people were free from fear
or want. That project has now lapsed. In its place is only a vague
51
exhortation for individuals to go and get rich.
52
Politicians labeled this new society the  enterprise society. The
paradigm citizen in this nation competes individually in global
markets as a business entrepreneur. His interest in getting rich
coincides with the national interest, as his business creates jobs and
products for export. His wealth allows him to exercise citizenship to
consume many goods and services previously provided by the
53
government, but now more efficiently provided by businesses like
his.
46. FRA § 6-15.
47. FRA § 4(3)(a).
48. See KELSEY, supra note 1, at 91; see also Shipley Praises Singapore Economic

Measures, T HE D OMINION (Wellington), Nov. 21, 1998, at 2.
49. See KELSEY, R OLLING BACK, supra note 35, at 252.
50. Tim Hazeldine, Taking New Zealand Seriously, Inaugural Lecture at the
University of Auckland (Aug. 1993) (on file with author); see Katherine Saville-Smith,
Women and the State, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE W ORLDS: W OMEN IN C ONTEMPORARY NEW
ZEALAND 198 (Shelagh Cox ed., 1987). The national identity of care was written in
an agricultural economy as farmers and neighbors all pitched in to help each other
in difficult times. This identity also had a strong self-sufficiency strand, onto which
the current individualist discourse is being written. See D AVID T HOMSON, A W ORLD
W ITHOUT W ELFARE: NEW ZEALAND S C OLONIAL E XPERIMENT 31 (1998). The welfare
state that existed in New Zealand was far from utopian. See NANCY F RASER, U NRULY
PRACTICES: POWER, D ISCOURSE AND GENDER IN C ONTEMPORARY SOCIAL T HEORY 144
(1989).
51. KELSEY, supra note 1, at 8.
52. KELSEY, R OLLING BACK, supra note 35, at 22-23.
53. See NIRA YUVAL-D AVIS, GENDER AND NATION 84-86 (1997).
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C. The Treaty Settlements Process: The Production of Maori Men as Global
Entrepreneurs
The Eurocentric logic of identity provides a framework for
analyzing the resolution of the tensions between the emerging
national identities of biculturalism and global entrepreneurship in
Aotearoa/New Zealand. These tensions came to a head in 1986 in
54
New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney General ( NZMC case ), where
the New Zealand Maori Council ( NZMC ), a statutory body,
challenged the privatization aspect of structural adjustment using the
SOE Act. The tension was resolved through the assimilation of some
Maori men as global entrepreneurs and partners to the neo-liberal
Treaty settlements. The logic of identity in dominant Eurocentric
discourses produces universal unmarked subjects, usually some
versions of white European males, who enjoy a wide range of
possibilities in constructing their identities.  Membership in the
dominant group . . . is legally marked by a convenient lack of
interdiction, by unlimited possibilities. 55 The production of the
universal unmarked subject relies on the logics of race, class, and
56
gender for the displacement of these marks onto others. The
logic of assimilation of these others to the position of the universal
unmarked subject operates in two steps. The first step recognizes the
sameness of the assimilated subject. The second part of this logic
resists the incorporation of difference, leaving the mark of difference
as  the primitive, the local, or the merely contingent
57
unassimilated. This logic also structures the assimilated sameness
58
hierarchically over the unassimilated difference.
In the NZMC case, the NZMC sought a court order enjoining the
government from privatizing state-owned assets under the SOE Act.
The NZMC claimed that by transferring state assets potentially subject
to future Tribunal claims to SOEs with a view to privatizing them, the
Crown was exercising its powers in a manner inconsistent with the
59
The
principles of the Treaty in contravention of the SOE Act.
decision in the case provided some very limited protections for such
assets, and highlighted the tension between biculturalism and
54. N.Z. Maori Council v. Atty Gen. [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641.
55. Colette Guillaumin, Race and Nature: the System of Marks. The Idea of a Natural
Group and Social Relationships, F EMINIST ISSUES 25, 41 (1988).
56. See C AROLE PATEMAN, T HE SEXUAL C ONTRACT 116-53 (1988).
57. David Lloyd, Race Under Representation, 13 O XFORD LITERARY R EV. 62, 73
(1991).
58. See id.
59. 1 N.Z.L.R. at 655; State-Owned Enterprises Act, 1986 § 9 (N.Z.).
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60

economic restructuring.
The NZMC case was followed by a raft of cases challenging the SOE
61
Act, and an increasing backlog of costly and time-consuming
62
These cases and claims presented a practical
Tribunal claims.
obstacle and a political challenge to the legitimacy of the
63
governments increasingly hegemonic economic agenda.
In
response, the government developed a policy of negotiating Treaty
claims directly, with the goal of settling them fully and finally.
Settlements of outstanding debts to Maori would be fiscally prudent,
would remove the drag from the economy represented by Maori
people and resources tied up in Tribunal claims, and would provide
finality to Maori grievances and certain title to state-owned
enterprises, enabling the Government to maximize profits from their
sale.
The Treaty settlements produced in this crucible of
biculturalism and neo-liberal economic policy involved structuring
the settlement proceeds into corporate ventures. The benefits of the
settlements were meant to  trickle down to Maori people over
time.64
The recognition of sameness is the first part of the logic of
65
assimilation. Some senior and influential Maori men were among
those at the forefront of the reconstruction of Aotearoa/New
66
Zealands national identity. In 1984, as the Labour Government
commenced implementation of neo-liberal economic policies, a few
of these men formed a corporation called Maori International Ltd.
( MIL ). Subsequent to the NZMC case, the directors of MIL
proposed the establishment of a Maori SOE that would  act as
financial manager, advocate, negotiator, business advisor,
commercial developer, lender and manager of trading operations
owned by Maori investors. 67 Maori opponents argued that this type
of economic approach would leave Maori  subordinated to colonial

60. See 1 N.Z.L.R. at 660, 665-68.
61. See, e.g., Tainui Maori Trust Bd. v. Atty Gen. [1989] 2 N.Z.L.R. 513; Love v.
Atty Gen., unreported (C.A. Mar. 20, 1989); N.Z. Maori Council v. Atty Gen. [1989]
2 N.Z.L.R. 142.
62. Sir Robert Te Katahi Mahuta, Tainui: A Case Study of Direct Negotiation, in
T REATY SETTLEMENTS: T HE U NFINISHED BUSINESS 79-80 (Geoff McLay ed., 1995);
KELSEY, R OLLING BACK, supra note 35, at 258.
63. See KELSEY, supra note 1, at 322.
64. Id. at 366.
65. MOIRA GATENS, IMAGINARY BODIES: E THICS, POWER AND C ORPOREALITY 25 (1996).
66. See KELSEY, R OLLING BACK, supra note 35, at 246-70.
67. KELSEY, QUESTION OF H ONOUR , supra note 9, at 250.
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economic and political structures, and the Maori SOE did not
materialize. Despite this outcome, the directors of MIL were the men
that the government turned to in its efforts to settle Treaty claims.
They became known as the Maori negotiators, assimilating
themselves consistent with the new national identity of global
entrepreneurs, or the  wheeler-dealer, BMW driving, cell phone
69
carrying entrepreneur[s].
These men negotiated settlements of
Treaty grievances as corporate deals mirroring the neo-liberal
policies of structural adjustment.
The two principle Maori negotiators of the first two major iwi
(tribal) settlements, which were the most politically visible, were
rewarded for assimilating to the new national identity with
knighthoods. The knighthoods came at great cost. Treaty claims had
to be negotiated in monetary terms and structured consistently with
neo-liberal economic theory, and had to ignore issues of selfdetermination and political power-sharing, such as Jacksons claim
70
for parallel legal systems. In order to be constructed as reasonable,
realistic, and deserving of knighthood, the negotiators assimilated to
the new national identity, accepted a small fraction of the estimated
71
amount of the claim, and agreed to fully and finally settle claims.
The first part of the logic of assimilation provided recognition for
the Maori negotiators only to the extent that they were willing and
able to mirror the new national identity as global entrepreneurs. The
title corporate warriors, popularly used for the Maori negotiators,
signals assimilation as both the reflection of the dominant corporate
partner, and the difference as the warrior marked local, primitive,
and raced other. Similarly, the Maori negotiators have been tagged
as the Business Brown Table, or just the Brown Table, as a
72
reflection of the Business Round Table marked by race. The central
corporation in one of the settlements is dubbed the Brown-faced
Brierleys, after Brierley Investment Ltd., one of the countrys largest
corporations. These labels in the neo-liberal economic terms of
globalisation are translated in the colonial marking of the assimilated

68. KELSEY, R OLLING BACK, supra note 35, at 248.
69. Id. at 338; see Larner, supra note 41, at 47.
70. See Audrey Young, Treaty Settlements Salve for Maori Sovereignty Calls, NEW
ZEALAND H ERALD , Oct. 7, 1995, at 5.
71. See Wayne Rumbles, Treaty of Waitangi Settlements Process: New
Relationship or New Mask? Sovereignty, Tino Rangatiratanga, Identity and
Postcolonialism 75-77 (1998) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, University of Waikato
School of Law) (on file with the University of Waikato School of Law).
72. Murray Horton, The Brown Table, 341N.Z. MONTHLY R EV. 14, 14 (1993).
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other as just like a white man or as a black Englishman.
Assimilation of the Maori negotiators as reasonable, realistic global
entrepreneurs deserving of knighthood also allows those Maori who
do not settle on these terms to be marked as unreasonable and
74
unrealistic:
Mr Graham has offered $40[M] to the Whaktohea tribe in the Bay
of Plenty to settle claims arising from the [C]rowns military
invasion. The confiscated land today might be worth billions, says
Mr Graham, but there are only 8000 of them (in the tribe) and the
idea that somehow they should get all of that money is just totally
75
unrealistic.

The assimilation of the Maori negotiators leaves a residue of race
that is reflected in appellations of brown and warrior, and is
displaced onto those Maori who refuse to settle Treaty grievances.
D. Displacing Gender and Culture: Centering Maori Women
Within the dominant logic of identity, production of the unmarked
subject of New Zealands new national identity also required
displacing the marks of gender and culture onto others. White
women are one of the necessary symbols of the local and particular
against which the universal subject is measured. Within the logic of
gender, white women, as those responsible for raising white men, are
the bearers and reproducers of Eurocentric cultures, and serve as a
76
The re-emergence of the
civilizing presence within the nation.
prominence of family values during the process of structural
adjustment and reconstruction of New Zealands national identity
may be seen as reaffirmation of the roles of white women as bearers
and reproducers of Eurocentric cultures.
The process of colonization involved attempts to conform Maori
women to the dominant logic of gender by constructing them as
bearers of culture and civilizers of Maori men. In the crucible of
discourses of structural adjustment and biculturalism, assimilation of
the Maori negotiators into the new national identity displaced the
73. See PATEMAN, supra note 56, at 85.
74. See Rumbles, supra note 71, at 83.
75. Anthony Hubbard, Counting the Cost of Alienation, SUNDAY STAR -T IMES
(Auckland), Aug. 31, 1997, at C2.
76. See A NTOINETTE BURTON, BURDENS OF H ISTORY: BRITISH F EMINISTS, INDIAN
W OMEN, AND IMPERIAL C ULTURE, 1865-1915 83 (1994); see also Lucy Bland, Feminist
Vigilantes of Late-Victorian England, in R EGULATING W OMANHOOD : H ISTORICAL E SSAYS ON
MARRIAGE, MOTHERHOOD AND SEXUALITY 33, 44 (Carol Smart ed., 1992); A NN E LSE, A
QUESTION OF A DOPTION: C LOSED STRANGER A DOPTION IN NEW ZEALAND , 1944-1974 1-13
(1991).
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The negotiators are
mark of culture onto Maori women.
constructed in opposition to the local, particular and primitive
represented by the colonized traditional culture imposed on Maori
women. Simultaneously, the agency of Maori women exceeds this
construction.
Prominent Maori women scholars have pointed out that there is
much evidence that, traditionally, Maori women assumed a whole
range of leadership roles.78 There is  unmistakable evidence that
womens lives were richer and more varied than has ever been
79
suggested in the received anthropological literature and  all
Maori women enjoyed a better status than that being experienced by
80
women in Europe at the time.
Imposing the dominant logic of
gender onto the operation of gender in Maori culture during
colonization in New Zealand involved rewriting the roles of Maori
81
women as subordinate to Maori men, and consigning Maori women
to the private sphere. For example, British officials often attempted
to refuse political recognition to Maori women leaders by refusing to
allow them to sign the Treaty, rendering them invisible in the public
sphere of the new British colony. Despite these attempts, a number
of Maori women signed at the insistence of the groups that they
represented.
These rewritten, static traditional roles are again imposed on
Maori women as part of the process of assimilation of some Maori
men. Maori women are often kept out of the management of Treaty
settlement assets with the argument that traditional Maori culture
requires men to manage assets:  There is no system of guarantee of a
place for Maori women within our own institutions or within the new
organisations which have evolved to manage our assets. Any talk of
structural change sends our Maori men into a tail spin about cultural
77. See Sandra Phelps, E/Raced Bodies: Postcolonial Contestations and the
Pathology of New Zealands National Identity (1988) (unpublished M.S.S. thesis,
University of Waikato) (on file at University of Waikato library).
78. See Annie Mikaere, Maori Women: Caught in the Contradictions of a Colonised
Reality, 2 W AIKATO L. R EV. 125 (1994). See generally Annette Sykes, Constitutional
Reform and Mana Wahine, in T HE F ISCAL E NVELOPE : E CONOMICS, POLITICS AND
C OLONISATION (1995); Linda Te Aho, The Dilemma of Conducting Research that
Challenges Accepted Practices and Perspectives Within a Tribal Administrative System, (paper
presented at Feminist Legal Academics Workshop: Law, Feminisms, Cultures and
Diversities, Univ. of Sydney, Feb. 24-26, 1999) (on file with author).
79. Judith Binney, Some Observations on the Status of Maori Women, in W OMEN IN
H ISTORY 2: E SSAYS ON W OMEN IN NEW ZEALAND 12,14 (Barbara Brookes et al. eds.,
1992).
80. Clea Te Kawehau Hoskins, In the Interests of Maori Women?: Discourses of
Reclamation, 13 W OMENS STUD . J. 25, 31-32 (1997).
81. See Mikaere, supra note 78, at 129.
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82

At the same time, assimilation
correctness and making waves.
indicates that the male roles are fluid:  The changes being made to
our culture are freeing up the role and status of all men, Maori and
Pakeha, whilst petrifying, meaning ceasing to change or develop, the
83
role and status of Maori women.
The gender spin on the settlements process is that fluidity is
appropriate for the roles of Maori men and the implicit assumption is
that womens roles must remain static.84 In other words, Maori
85
women carry, or symbolize, traditional Maori culture.
The
exclusion of women from the management of settlement assets
reflects the dominant Eurocentric logic of gender, within which
women are bearers of culture.
The actions of many Maori women far exceed the construction of
 Maori women through this logic of gender. Maori women have
been central to the revitalization of Maori culture over the past two
86
Many occupy powerful and influential positions within
decades.
Maori culture and society, and  have maintained a vanguard position
87
on Treaty issues and debates with the Crown. A recent survey of
Maori people revealed that leadership was firmly located at the hapu
(sub-tribe) level (not in the so-called national figures, some of
whom were chosen by the government to negotiate the Treaty
settlements). Furthermore, two of the only three Maori leaders who
gained over ten percent recognition outside of their iwi borders were
88
women.
A theoretical analysis that centers on Maori women focuses on
their pivotal position in the operation of the settlements process.
The political activism of some Maori women, gaining momentum
from the 1970s, operated to disrupt the constructed illusion of unity
of the nation. Regaining the illusion of stability and, in particular,
reaffirmation of the dominance of the minority of privileged white
82. Ripecka Evans, The Negation of Powerlessness: Maori Feminism, a Perspective, 20
H ECATE 53, 64 (1994).
83. Kathie Irwin, Towards Theories of Maori Feminisms, in F EMINIST VOICES:
W OMENS STUDIES T EXTS FOR A OTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND 1, 18 (Rosemary Du Plessis et
al. eds., 1992); see generally Catherine P. Kingfisher, Rhetoric of (Female) Savagery:
Welfare reform in the United States and Aotearoa/New Zealand, 11 NATL W OMENS STUD .
A SSN J. 1, 1-15 (2000).
84. See Irwin, supra note 83, at 19.
85. See id. at 16.
86. See generally Evans, supra note 82.
87. Tania Rangiheuea, The Role of Maori Women in Treaty Negotiations and
Settlements, in T REATY SETTLEMENTS: T HE U NFINISHED BUSINESS 108 (Geoff McLay ed.,
1995)
88. See Mikaere, supra note 78, at 137 n.98.
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men, required erasing these Maori women activists as serious political
89
subjects. Cooperation of at least some Maori men in a temporary
alliance among men across race in the Treaty settlement process
90
facilitated this erasure.
Necessary to this dynamic is the
construction of the Maori negotiators as reasonable and rational
assimilated subjects. Maori women who refuse to participate in this
production by performing the corresponding roles of bearers of
traditional Maori culture are labeled Maori activists and
91
represented as  hysterical and out there. The construction of their
hysterical claims for full political self-determination in opposition to
the realistic acceptance of the Maori negotiators of tiny fractions of
commodified claims operates to maintain the legitimacy of the myth
92
of the illusion of national unity.
III. A OTEAROA /NEW ZEALAND S F IRST W OMEN PRIME MINISTERS
While the settlements process operated to silence and erase the
political activism of some Maori women, backlash against it
contributed to political instability, opening space for the political
coup bringing Aotearoa/New Zealands first white woman Prime
Minister to power. Another factor contributing to the instability was
the transition to an MMP electoral system and government in 1996.
Simultaneously, the new MMP coalition governing system and the
results of structural adjustment and free trade agreements limited the
power of the Prime Minister, raising the question of whether that
position is in the process of regendering to the feminine. The events
surrounding the coalition government headed by New Zealands
second, and first elected, woman Prime Minister highlight this
regendering process.
Studies of women as national leaders indicate that most have held
office in less developed countries and have been leaders in times of
93
social or political instability, or when crises or transitions require a
94
mediator-type figure. Prior to the transition to MMP, New Zealands
Parliamentary structure and party politics allowed and facilitated
89. See KELSEY, supra note 1, at 50.
90. See id. at 151; Evans, supra note 82, at 63.
91. KELSEY, supra note 1, at 321. See generally Te Aho, supra note 78.
92. See Paul McHugh, Crown-Tribe Relations: Contractualism and Coexistence in an
Intercultural Context, in T HE NEW C ONTRACTUALISM 199 (Glyn David et. al. eds., 1997).
93. See Michael A. Genovese, Women as National Leaders: What Do We Know?, in
W OMEN AS NATIONAL LEADERS 211, 212-13 (Michael A. Genovese ed., 1993).
94. See, e.g., V. SPIKE PETERSON & A NNE SISSON R UNYAN, GLOBAL GENDER ISSUES 4648 (1993).
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95

Its single-house Westminster-style Parliament was
rapid change.
elected on an FPP basis. Combined with an entrenched two-party
system in which each party maintained rigid internal discipline, and
no entrenched constitution or Bill of Rights, this system resulted in
the Cabinet (the Prime Minister and Ministers appointed by the
Prime Minister or elected by that partys Members of Parliaments
96
( MPs ) enjoying  unbridled power once elected. Changing the
electoral system to MMP was a manifestation of opposition to
structural adjustment. The change was seen to be likely to facilitate
the participation of more political parties, to result in coalition
governments that might be checked by smaller parties, and to result
in a more representative Parliament. It was argued that MMP would
97
 bridle the power of the Cabinet and Prime Minister, make the
role of the Prime Minister more difficult, in part due to the
mediation skills required in a coalition government, and complicate
98
problems of political leadership and cooperation. The transition
from an FPP to an MMP electoral system was also likely to result in
some instability of both the first MMP coalition and its Cabinet. In
particular, the transition from FPP to MMP style governing was likely
to be politically hazardous, as both politicians and voters adjusted
their actions and expectations to the new government format and
process.
The first MMP election was held in 1996. Winston Peters, a Maori
MP who had resigned from the National Party, led the new New
Zealand First ( NZ First ) party, which claimed to be centrist and
had a high proportion of Maori members. NZ Firsts popularity,
which gave Peters the power to form a coalition with either National
or Labour, reflected a significant portion of the electorates
opposition to structural adjustment policies and continued
reluctance to vote for either party that had implemented the policies.
While many of NZ Firsts voters expected Peters to form a coalition
with Labour subsequent to the election, in a surprise move in early
1997, he chose National, led by Jim Bolger, instead.
Treaty settlements had been associated with the Bolger
government since at least 1995, and Bolger was closely associated with
99
Treaty Negotiations Minister Doug Graham. In 1997, negotiating
95. See SCHICK, supra note 24, at 14.
96. PALMER , supra note 19, at 14.
97. GEOFFREY PALMER & MATTHEW PALMER , BRIDLED POWER : NEW ZEALAND

GOVERNMENT U NDER MMP 309 (3d ed. 1997).
98. See id. at 14, 54.
99. See Ruth Laugesen, Bolger Moves Slowly to Conciliation After Waitangi, T HE
D OMINION (Wellington), Feb. 13, 1995, at 2.
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the second large iwi settlement, Graham was under attack as part of
the white backlash against settlements:  The handout of $170 million
of our hard-earned taxes to a perennially dissatisfied bunch of people
who claim part-Maori ancestry is a preposterous grovel, an
acknowledgement Doug Graham and his supporters have succumbed
100
Grahams  supporters here may well
to political correctness.
have included Bolger.
In June of 1997, Graham was castigated in the press for stating that
there was  one law for Maori people, [and] a different law for nonMaori people, and it was suggested that National was losing voter
101
Graham publicly
support due to the Treaty settlements process.
explained that his statement referred to customary rights that Maori
had prior to the Treaty that had not been extinguished by
Parliament; the second settlement would recognize a right by the iwi
to use about one hectare of Department of Conservation land for up
102
to 210 days per year. Despite the explanation, Graham came under
 heavy fire from other National MPs for damaging the party in the
103
polls.
In July, businesses criticized Peters first budget due to its higher
104
By September of 1997, eighty-four percent of
social spending.
those polled disapproved of the Coalitions performance, Peters
gained only two percent support as preferred Prime Minister, and
105
there were calls to dump Bolger as Prime Minister. Disapproval of
the Coalition rose to ninety-five percent in October, and Bolgers
ratings continued to fall. Meanwhile, speculation rose that Nationals
Transport Minister Jenny Shipley would make a bid for Prime
Minister. Shipleys route to power in a conservative party included
being Minister of Womens Affairs and Social Welfare Minister
during 1990 and 1991 when the Government repealed Pay Equity
legislation, cut benefits, introduced an ECA with minimal protections
for workers and ended lump sum payments in the accident

100. Frank Haden, Big Handouts and the Maori Lottery, SUNDAY STAR -T IMES
(Auckland), Sept. 28, 1997, at 2.
101. Frank Haden, Graham Puts His Foot in His Mouth  Again, SUNDAY STAR -T IMES
(Auckland), June 8, 1997, at 4.
102. Doug Graham, Recognition of Maori Rights Is Not a Short Cut to Apartheid, T HE
PRESS (Christchurch), June 11, 1997, at 13.
103. Ruth Laugesen, Graham Accused of Party Damage, SUNDAY STAR -T IMES
(Auckland), June 15, 1997, at 1.
104. See Graham, supra note 101, at 9. But see Sarah Catherall, NZ First to Grapple
With Cuts, SUNDAY STAR-T IMES (Auckland), July 12, 1998, at 3.
105. See Sarah Boyd & Brent Edwards, Dire Poll Backs Up Call to Dump PM-Fletcher,
T HE E VENING POST (Wellington), Sept. 23, 1997, at 3.
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compensation scheme, all policies that disadvantaged women, and
disproportionately disadvantaged Maori women. While Graham had
107
been tapped as a possible successor to Bolger in 1993, it was
Shipley, perceived to be re-orientating National to its right wing
108
roots, who executed the successful coup in early November of 1997.
Although Shipley retained Graham as Treaty Negotiations Minister,
probably as part of the price for retaining NZ Firsts support, one of
her first moves was to demote Graham from sixth to eleventh position
109
in the Cabinet. White backlash against Treaty settlements was seen
110
to have cost Graham his aspirations for higher office.
Few analysts have explicitly suggested, as this article has, that white
backlash to Treaty settlements contributed to opening space for the
first woman Prime Minister. Rather, Bolgers fall from power was
often widely attributed to his willingness to soften Nationals policies
111
to retain the support of its coalition partner, seen as instability by
politicians and voters expecting an FPP performance from the first
MMP government. This article argues that white backlash, combined
with the instability of the transition to MMP governing and the first
coalition government, helped to create the space for Shipleys
successful bid for Prime Minister.
Some political analysts did highlight the difficult job facing Shipley
as Prime Minister, one suggesting that it was a  mission impossible,
noting that the odds were  stacked high against reviving a party
112
eight years in power with a disapproval rating of ninety percent.
Much later, the question of whether the National party set her up to
fail in the  awful first MMP government was posed, and it was
suggested that  no Prime Minister could have run a convincing
113
government at that time. Far from being the cause for celebration
that feminists might have enjoyed, this analysis suggests that New
Zealands first woman Prime Minster, an MP who gained credibility in
a conservative party by implementing policies detrimental to women,
106. See Brent Edwards, The Battle of Political Amazons, T HE E VENING POST
(Wellington), Nov. 10, 1997, at 7.
107. See Doug Graham & Tracy Watkins, Treaty Job a Turning Point, T HE PRESS
(Christchurch), Aug. 31, 1998, at 7.
108. See Peter Luke, A Sharp Step to the Right: Fact, Fiction, or Mischief?, T HE PRESS
(Christchurch), Nov. 19, 1997, at 11.
109. See Graham & Watkins, supra note 107, at 7.
110. See id.
111. See Ian Templeton, Wake-up Call for Fiscal Discipline, SUNDAY STAR -T IMES
(Auckland), Oct. 19, 1997, at 2.
112. Ruth Laugesen, New Leader May Face Mission: Impossible, SUNDAY STAR -T IMES
(Auckland), Nov. 9, 1997, at 2.
113. Colin James, Patriarchal Party Games, MGMT . (Auckland), Feb. 1, 1999, at 73.
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was supported in her coup by white backlash and rewarded for her
114
efforts with the job of Prime Minister when no one else wanted it.
The 1999 election of Helen Clark, as leader of a centre-left coalition
between Labour and the Alliance, supports the suggestion that
Shipleys task was impossible.
The experiences of Bolger and Shipley suggested that MMP was
resulting in limiting the power of the Prime Minister in the Cabinet.
The instability introduced by the transition to MMP continued
through the 1999 election. It was still unclear whether MMP style
coalition governing would be successful in New Zealand. Further, the
early experiences of the 1999 coalition government highlight the
effect of policies of structural adjustment in limiting, at least at this
moment, the ability of a New Zealand government to make changes
inconsistent with neo-liberal economic ideology. This analysis raises
the question of whether the position of Prime Minister in New
Zealand is in the process of regendering to the feminine.
Georgia Duerst-Lahti argues that women tend to repeat in top
government posts either because the posts are gendered female
because they are consistent with roles ascribed to women more
generally, as is the case in the United States with Health and Human
Services, or because once a woman has held the post it becomes
regendered to female.115 She describes the regendering of a post:
 The basic premise is that highly valued and prestigious work loses
status once women perform it; the work becomes gendered in a way
116
that is other than fully masculine and loses value in the process. It
should be noted that it may not be possible to distinguish cause and
117
The position may become less valued
effect in this feminization.
over time because women hold it, or women may hold it because it
lacks prestige or is losing prestige. The result of a regendering of a
position to the feminine is likely to be some combination of a loss of
118
budget, prestige, and authority.
Both the change to an MMP electoral system and policies of
structural adjustment have limited the power of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet. Kelsey has argued that restructuring of the public
sector, combined with deregulation, market liberalization, free trade
114. See Laugesen, supra note 112, at 2.
115. Georgia Duerst-Lahti, Reconceiving Theories of Power: Consequences of
Masculinism in the Executive Branch, in T HE O THER E LITES: W OMEN, POLITICS, AND
POWER IN THE E XECUTIVE BRANCH 11, 20 (Mary Ellen Borrelli & Janet M. Martin eds.,
1997).
116. Id. at 21.
117. See id.
118. See id.
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119

and fiscal restraint all limit Crown sovereignty, with the intent to
120
facilitate the creation of a global denationalising  economic space.
The resulting practical political limitations on successor governments
to these radical changes are great:
According to the globalisers, future New Zealand governments
have little room to re-regulate financial markets, capital movements
and investor rules, to increase taxes, or to provide support for
domestic producers. By the same reasoning, any government
policies that impact on international competitiveness and
profitability would also be fettered, including those related to the
121
Treaty of Waitangi, labour, the environment, and social policy.

The limitations on the current Labour Coalition Government as a
result of the entrenchment of neo-liberal ideology were
demonstrated in the response to its introduction of an Employment
122
Relations Bill ( Bill ) intended to provide Unions with a moderate
rebalancing of power after ten years of the harsh deregulation of the
ECA. The business community reacted adversely to the Bill, and
there was a plunge in business confidence polls that some argued was
123
contrived and unnecessary.
The government was forced to water
down the already moderate changes contained in the Bill before
124
enacting it.
Research suggests that a regendering of a position is accompanied
by loss of prestige, budget, and authority. The limitations on
government decision-making imposed by structural adjustment and
illustrated by the attempt to change New Zealands labour law, even
with a clear Parliamentary majority, suggest a loss of authority of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet. While the FRA and RBA, which contain
key neo-liberal monetary policies, technically may be repealed by a
simple majority of Parliament, they have so far been treated as
sacrosanct on the basis that they are required to maintain the
125
The requirements of the FRA
confidence of  the markets.
effectively limit the budgetary discretion of the government. The
MMP political system requires political parties to share power in
government and requires their leaders to be prepared to listen and
119. See KELSEY, supra note 1, at 368.
120. SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING C ONTROL?: SOVEREIGNTY IN AN A GE OF GLOBALIZATION
44 (1996).
121. KELSEY, R ECLAIMING THE F UTURE , supra note 44, at 375.
122. See Employment Relations Bill, 2000 (N.Z.).
123. See Phil Love, Wiping Smiles Off Faces, E VENING POST (Wellington), June 3,
2000, at 11.
124. See Business Worries, T HE PRESS (Christchurch), May 29, 2000, at 4.
125. KELSEY, R ECLAIMING THE F UTURE , supra note 44, at 376.
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compromise. These are characteristics that are gendered female, and
even when demonstrated by Prime Minister Bolger, seem to have
contributed to his fall. The requirement of these characteristics may
contribute to the regendering of the position of Prime Minister, and
its resulting loss of prestige.
This articles argument that the position of Prime Minister in
Aotearoa/New Zealand may be in the process of regendering at this
particular historical moment is not meant to suggest that New
Zealands two women Prime Ministers have lacked agency or been
passive victims in attaining these positions. On the contrary, it has
been argued that  both Clarke and Shipley got to where they are
through machiavellian politicking. 126 Further, as discussed above,
the research suggests that women become national leaders at times of
instability, or when the position is faced with particular challenges.
This analysis suggests that what we know about womens roles
generally might apply here; women have to work harder and perform
better for less money, prestige and authority than men would be
127
likely to accept for the same job.
IV. C ONCLUSION
This paper has traced two strands of the race and gender dynamics
of Aotearoa/New Zealands political economy. It has argued that the
willingness of some Maori men to assimilate to the new national
identity of global entrepreneurs through the process of Treaty
settlements has operated as an alliance of men across race to silence
and erase the political demands of some Maori women activists for
Maori self-determination. Ironically, white backlash against these
same settlements opened space for the rise to power of
Aotearoa/New Zealands first white woman Prime Minister. Jenny
Shipley gained credibility for her rise in the conservative National
party by implementing policies detrimental to women, especially
beneficiaries and working class women, where Maori women tend to
be disproportionately represented. If Aotearoa/New Zealand is to
progress beyond repeating the old assimilative, silencing and erasing
tactics of colonization, it must be willing to adopt analyses that center
Maori women in the search for new solutions to old problems.

126. Edwards, supra note 106, at 7 ( Both used subterfuge, trickery and treachery
to wrest control of their respective parties. ).
127. See PETERSON & R UNYAN, supra note 94, at 88.
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